“The time will come when England will regard this island as the Gibraltar of America.”

-Sir Robert Bond
Newfoundland Prime Minister 1890

The Second World War and the subsequent arrival of thousands of American and Canadian military personnel marked a tremendous turning point in Newfoundland’s history. On the day the war began in September 1939, Newfoundland was a dispirited, bankrupt, and defenseless British *dominion-in-abeyance* off the east coast of Canada. Its under-educated and under-employed population was ruled by a London-appointed Commission of Government and the Colony was kept afloat by loans and grants from the British Treasury. Despite being intensely loyal, and in disregard of its tremendous sacrifice during the Great War, Newfoundland was really seen as the Cinderella of the British Empire. This changed in the summer of 1940 with Nazi Germany’s victorious *Blitzkrieg* through Western Europe. Only Britain stood defiant, and on the other side of the Atlantic, Newfoundland was now viewed, not only as Canada’s “first line of defence” but actually “the key to the western defence system.” In a very short time, Newfoundland boasted five military and civilian aerodromes, two naval bases, two seaplane bases and five army bases, and tens of thousands of Canadian and American military personnel were posted from coast to coast and in Labrador. This paper argues...
that despite the historic animosity between the two countries, the unprecedented economic and social repercussions of this “friendly invasion” during the Second World War ultimately led to Newfoundland’s decision to join the Canadian confederation in 1949.

Canada made the commitment to defend Newfoundland even before that country entered the war against Germany. Whereas once Ottawa considered Newfoundland nothing more than a “liability,” Canada now saw its sister dominion as an “essential Canadian interest” and an important part of the “Canadian orbit.” Indeed, Prime Minister Mackenzie King argued in September 1939 that not only was the defence of Newfoundland “essential to the security of Canada” but guaranteeing the Colony’s integrity would actually assist Britain’s war effort. Regardless, the Canadian government did not act on that promise until the German victory in Europe. After the fall of France in June 1940, Ottawa dispatched the 1st Battalion of the Black Watch of Canada (on board the SS Antonia) to Newfoundland to protect the Botwood seaplane base and the Newfoundland Airport (Gander), along with five Douglas Digby bombers from RCAF No. 10 Squadron (with personnel).

Shortly thereafter, Canadian contractors started building Camp Lester on the outskirts of St. John’s and the newly appointed Commander, Combined Newfoundland and Canadian Military Forces, Brigadier P Earnshaw arrived in November. By the end of 1940, close to 800 men from the Canadian 53rd Infantry Battalion were spread throughout Newfoundland’s capital city and area, ready for any German air or sea attack. Canadian Army personnel eventually also protected Lewisporte (seen as the most likely insertion point for an enemy attack on the Newfoundland Airport), Rigolet (at the entrance to Lake
Melville, Labrador) and the *Goose Bay Air Station* (the largest airport in the world by 1943), plus manned numerous artillery, radio and radar installations along the coast of Newfoundland and Labrador.9

The Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) also arrived in Newfoundland during 1940 and set up a Naval Examination Service to control shipping entering St. John’s Harbour. By summer 1942, the Canadians had turned Newfoundland’s capital city into a well-defended port and home base for not only the Newfoundland Defence Force (NDF) - comprising five corvettes (when available), two minesweepers and four Fairmile patrol boats - but also the Newfoundland Escort Force (NEF), renamed the Mid-Ocean Escort Force (MOEF) in February 1942. This force, under Admiral Leonard Murray RCN, protected the vital trans-Atlantic convoys to Britain, and numbered approximately 70 warships, including British escorts based out of the US naval base at Argentia. By 1943, there were some 5,000 RCN personnel at St. John’s, not including the thousands of ships’ crew that were billeted at the Buckmasters’ Field Naval Barracks. The RCN eventually developed facilities at Harbour Grace, Bay Bulls, Botwood, Corner Brook, and Red Bay and Goose Bay in Labrador. HMCS *Chambly* and HMCS *Moose Jaw* scored the NEF’s first U-boat kill in September 1941.10

At the same time, the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) started constructing its air base near the community of Torbay just outside St. John’s. These aircraft would protect St. John’s and Bell Island (providing the iron ore to Cape Breton’s steel mills11), as well as patrol the convoy routes east of Newfoundland. During the summer of 1941, Group Captain CM McEwen established Group 1 Headquarters at the *Newfoundland Hotel* in St. John’s alongside the Royal Canadian Navy (moving to the new joint
RCN/RCAF Headquarters on Plymouth Road the following year). RCAF Air Station Torbay opened in October 1941 with two runways, and patrols commenced when four Hudson bombers from No. 2 (British) Squadron arrived from Nova Scotia the following month. In February 1942, due to the dramatic increase in passenger traffic between Canada and Newfoundland (and congestion on the “Newfy Bullet” as the Newfoundland Railway was known), the Commission of Government approved a regular Trans-Canada Airlines (TCA) service between the two dominions (TCA became Air Canada in 1965, and was privatized in 1988). The RCAF developed additional facilities at Gander and Goose Bay, and utilized the two American aerodromes on the Island. RCAF personnel also manned radar stations at Torbay, Cape Bauld (at the tip of the Great Northern Peninsula), Port-aux-Basques, and Spotted Island and Brig Harbour in Labrador. As well, the RCAF operated an early warning system at Cape Ray on the west coast, and took over the five US radar stations on the Island in 1944.\(^{12}\) The Americans had arrived at St. John’s in January 1941 on board the United States Army Transport (USAT) *Edmund B Alexander* thanks to the (in)famous Anglo-American Leased Bases Agreement (signed March 17, 1941).\(^{13}\)

Reeling from the speed and success of German forces on the Continent in the Spring/Summer 1940, the British were dangerously short of destroyers for North Atlantic convoy escort duty. The Royal Navy (RN) lost a significant number of these warships during the ill-fated Norwegian campaign the previous winter and the May evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) at Dunkirk, with still more being sunk or damaged while held in port to counter the expected German invasion of Britain. Prime Minister Winston Churchill appealed to American President Franklin D Roosevelt in May 1940
for “forty or fifty of [his] older destroyers” to fill the breach until new construction replaced British losses.\textsuperscript{14}

Roosevelt was more than willing, but at this time the United States was still officially neutral, and such a transfer would both flout international law and antagonize the local isolationist lobby. As a solution, Churchill proposed that Britain - as a gesture of friendship - lease base sites on British territory in the Western Hemisphere to the Americans, and the US reciprocate with the requested destroyers. Unfortunately, this arrangement was a bit too subtle for American policymakers, who preferred a more direct and documented swap. This presented the British with difficulties of their own as a straight exchange of assets could alienate the territories concerned, as well as possibly inflame public opinion in the United Kingdom. British Minister of Supply Lord Beaverbrook (New Brunswick newspaper magnate Max Aitken) did not want Britain to make a bargain it would later regret. He felt that granting British territory to the United States for ninety-nine years in exchange for fifty Great War-vintage destroyers was a bad deal.\textsuperscript{15}

The answer involved a compromise that gave the British their gesture and the Americans their business deal. Leases were given “freely and without consideration” in Newfoundland and Bermuda, while similar facilities were traded in Jamaica, Trinidad, British Guiana, St. Lucia, and Antigua for the fifty destroyers.\textsuperscript{16} This solved the problem, and the “destroyers for bases” deal - as it became known - was announced on 3 September 1940. Ultimately, the United States developed facilities in Newfoundland at St. John’s (Fort Pepperell/Camp Alexander), Argentia (Argentia Naval-Air Station/ Fort McAndrew), Gander, Stephenville (Harmon Air Force Base/Camp Morris), and Goose
Bay, Labrador, as well as manned numerous artillery/radar sites throughout the Island. By war’s end, thousands of American servicemen were stationed throughout Newfoundland and Labrador, and tens of thousands of US military personnel and passengers had passed through the various US facilities throughout the Colony.¹⁷

The most stunning impact of all this military activity was economic. During the fall of 1943 (the peak year of construction) over 20,000 Newfoundlanders were employed in building the various facilities. Over the course of the war years, the United States invested $114,000,000 (USD) on their facilities in Newfoundland, and the Canadians $65,000,000 (CAD).¹⁸ Further, military personnel rose to upwards of 29,000 (13,000 US, 16,000 CA) in 1943, all of whom purchased local goods and services.¹⁹ This infusion of cash into the Newfoundland economy had a huge impact on the people of Newfoundland both directly and indirectly.

In 1939, nearly 50,000 Newfoundlanders received some form of government assistance; by 1942, for the first time since the non-elected British-appointed Commission replaced the Alderdice Government in 1934, unemployment was virtually eliminated.²⁰ Tens of thousands of Newfoundlanders worked not only on base construction but were also employed in their support and supply.²¹ While the Americans tended to provide for their bases through direct shipments from the US, the Canadians generally obtained their supplies and services from local sources. Further, as the cost of living rose dramatically during the war years and the Commission of Government tried to implement wage and price controls, local employers were still forced to match wages paid by the two occupying forces or lose workers (the resource sector was hit particularly hard by employee shortages during the war). Whereas pre-war, only the merchant,
professional and political/bureaucratic elite of the Colony could afford a comparable standard of living to that of the United States and Canada. by 1942, most Newfoundland residents now tasted the benefits of the booming wartime economy.22

Government revenues - mainly from Customs and Excise taxes - also rose considerably during the war years, from an expected $4,000,000 deficit in 1939 to a surplus of $796,531 on revenues of $16,287,505 in the 1940-1941 fiscal year; $7,211,182 on revenues of $23,294,296 in 1941-1942; $3,681,200 on $19,514,000 in 1942-1943; $6,372,963 on $28,552,363 in 1943-1944; and a $6,991,753 surplus on revenues of an astounding $33,310,000 in the 1944-1945 fiscal year. By the end of the Second World War, the Newfoundland government had a cumulative budgetary surplus of some 29 million dollars ($430,000,000 current CAD).23

Government expenditures rose correspondingly, resulting in new investments in education (free and mandatory for those 14 years and under), infrastructure, healthcare, pensions for disabled veterans and their families, and even loans and gifts to Great Britain. During the 1943 fiscal year, the Newfoundland Government purchased 7500 quintals of salt fish from local suppliers and shipped it to the UK as a contribution to the mother country from the people of Newfoundland.24

The Newfoundland Government also inherited a tremendous amount of military property and infrastructure at war’s end. In St. John’s, this included two hospitals, the RCN/RCAF Headquarters, the Naval Barracks complex at Buckmasters’ Field and on Blackhead, the Tactical Training Centre on the Southside, as well as numerous other properties within the city limits.25 RCAF Air Station Torbay eventually became what is
now St. John’s International Airport, serving 1.6 million domestic and international passengers annually.\textsuperscript{26}

St. John’s Harbour was also transformed. Whereas, the waterfront was a tangle of decrepit wharves and finger-piers when they arrived, the RCN upgraded all the moorings along the Southside to naval standards (most times, also improving the owner’s property with paving, fencing, access, etc.) and constructed new facilities such as HMC Dockyard (now the Port of St. John’s Shipping Terminal) and the fuel tank farm, which was sold to \textit{Imperial Oil} in 1946.\textsuperscript{27}

Hospitals at Gander, Botwood and Lewisporte were added to the health care system; a fourth, the \textit{US Memorial Hospital} in St. Lawrence, was officially opened 6 June 1954 – the 10\textsuperscript{th} Anniversary of D-Day - by the United States Government as a gift to the people of St. Lawrence and Lawn who rescued and cared for the survivors of the USS \textit{Pollux}/USS \textit{Truxtun} disaster, 18 February 1942.\textsuperscript{28} Hundreds of miles of roads were laid during the war, and the Newfoundland Railway was enlarged with new rail lines and rolling stock. Further, modern communication systems were installed and/or augmented throughout the Island and in Labrador; navigational beacons were improved and LORAN (Long Range Aid to Navigation) added. This list lengthened continually over the next few decades as the Americans (and to some degree the Canadians) closed their various facilities at St. John’s, Argentia, Botwood, Lewisporte, Gander, Stephenville, and Goose Bay, passing title to federal, provincial, and/or municipal governments.\textsuperscript{29}

The social impact of this “friendly invasion” was also substantial. With the arrival of thousands of young men in communities throughout Newfoundland, many away from home for the first time, social interaction between the genders was inevitable. Some
people suggest that the arrival of the Americans and Canadians heralded the introduction of modern North American culture to Newfoundland. Conversely, historians argue that it was actually the other way around in many cases. Both the United States and Canada were extensively agrarian nations pre-Second World War and a large number of the servicemen that arrived in Newfoundland came from small rural communities throughout both countries. To many of these young men, St. John’s, or really any of the other substantial settlements in Newfoundland, were the largest cities/towns they had ever experienced.\textsuperscript{30}

Some indication of this can be found in the frequency with which the visiting forces found themselves in trouble with local law enforcement. Indeed, statistics for St. John’s (where the largest number of military personnel were based) indicate that by the end of 1941 - a year from the arrival of the Americans in January ‘41 and six months from the creation of the NEF - there were 3417 criminal prosecutions, an increase of 1203 over 1940 and almost double the 1939 total.\textsuperscript{31} By 1943, there were 8000 cases - 1000 more than 1942.\textsuperscript{32}

Popular memory suggests that the Americans were much better behaved than the Canadians, and a review of the Magistrate’s Court section of The Evening Telegram during the war years would seem to bear this out. Seldom did a day go by that a Canadian soldier or sailor did not appear before the local magistrate, mainly for liquor related offences.\textsuperscript{33} Yet, in truth, the infrequency with which American servicemen appeared before the Bench resulted more from an agreement between the Newfoundland Government and US authorities than from better behaviour. Some American military personnel did appear before local courts but the majority of cases were transferred to the
US military for adjudication. Another mitigating factor was that the Americans provided recreational facilities for their personnel on their various bases whereas the Canadian services relied heavily on local amenities.

Barely more than a good-sized town, St. John’s nevertheless did its utmost to meet this challenge. Sports are a major feature of any recreation program and there was no shortage of competitive and recreational opportunities in the City, all available to military personnel. Rugby, soccer, baseball, softball and cricket were played at the Feildian and Ayre Athletic Grounds, and at the St. George’s and Memorial Fields. In addition to the various service and open leagues, hockey was played at the St. Bon’s Forum and the Prince of Wales Arena almost daily. Tennis was offered at Government House (officers only) and at Bowring Park and the Riverdale Tennis Club. Swimming, golf, squash, and bowling were available to officers and men alike at various facilities throughout the City, and bicycles could be rented at Martin’s Cycle Shop, Duckworth Street.

Of course, “liquid refreshment” is a requirement for any successful night out, and military personnel had their pick of, what were once, the more exclusive establishments throughout St. John’s including The City Club, The Bally Haly Golf Club, The Bella Vista Country Club, The Old Colony Club and The Terra Nova Club. Naval officers had their own Seagoing Officers Club better known as The Crow’s Nest next to the National War Memorial on Water Street. Other ranks had naval canteens at HMC Dockyard on Water Street and at the Naval Barracks at Buckmasters’ Field, and dozens of Downtown cafés and taverns catered to the ordinary soldier and sailor. Neither was there a shortage of places to eat, although military authorities had to put a number of them “off limits” due to
health concerns. A variety of restaurants and lunch counters were located on Water and Duckworth Streets, and tearooms on Henry Street and Rawlins Cross. All military personnel were welcome at the United Services Organizations (USO) Club at the corner of Bonaventure Avenue and Merrymeeting Road. For a town of just over 40,000 pre-war, St. John’s boasted a total of five cinemas - the Paramount, Capitol, Nickel, Star and York theatres.

Scores of local women attended the various functions on the bases themselves (especially in the Americans’ case) and also volunteered at local entertainment facilities and hostels that sprang up in communities across the Island. The Caribou Hut in St. John’s - probably the most famous - served more than 1,500,000 meals, rented in excess of 250,000 beds, showed over 1500 movies, and held close to 500 dances, with a total attendance of more than of 700,000 people over the five years it operated. The United Services Overseas (USO), The Knights of Columbus and The Red Triangle were also popular spots, and visiting forces were often invited into people’s homes for Sunday dinner or on special occasions such as Thanksgiving, Christmas and/or Easter.  

The young women of Newfoundland were very impressed with the health and apparent wealth of the thousands of young men who flooded their local streets and venues. Marriages and pregnancies (and incidents of venereal disease) increased dramatically during the first few years, to the point that US authorities - fearing that Newfoundland women were only interested in snaring an American husband with all his fringe benefits - prohibited local marriage, even condemning some love-struck young men to prison terms for doing so. The Canadians, while not encouraging such unions, did not prohibit them (and certainly did not jail their young men) and seldom did a week go
by that the St. John’s *Evening Telegram* failed to announce an engagement or marriage between “a local girl” and a visiting serviceman. At war’s end, many local women (and men, as there was also a large women’s forces presence in Newfoundland during the war\[^{38}\]) joined their spouse in Canada or the United States, but numerous Canadians stayed in Newfoundland and raised families. One can argue that these familial connections within the community played some part in Newfoundland’s integration into the Canadian federation in 1949.\[^{39}\]

The military presence had profound political ramifications for the *Colony of Newfoundland*. When the country relinquished democratic rule for Commission of Government in 1934, it was on the premise that political corruption and incompetence were the root causes of Newfoundland’s near bankrupt finances. The 1933 *Newfoundland Royal Commission Report* proposed, rather paternalistically, that Newfoundlanders needed “a rest from politics” for a few years.\[^{40}\] Thus, the somewhat vague promise was made to return responsible government when the Colony was once again on its financial feet. A Commission of Government followed the next year, comprised of three Britons and three Newfoundlanders, headed by the Governor. Unfortunately, the *Amulree Report*’s supposition as to the causes of Newfoundland’s woes (the general moral failure and ignorance of Newfoundlanders) was seriously flawed.\[^{41}\] The real reason was the collapse of the fishing industry due to the Great Depression (not to mention the “Great Big Sea” of 1929\[^{42}\]), and the Colony’s dependence on a resource-based economy. This led to a dramatic drop in Government revenues at the same time that demand for poor relief increased exponentially. Consequently, many of the Commission of Government’s social engineering experiments over the next five years failed.\[^{43}\] As a result, the
Commission was left (as were previous Newfoundland governments) with courting foreign capital - usually at the expense of local workers and their families.\textsuperscript{44} Ultimately, the solution to “The Problem of Newfoundland” was the start of the Second World War and the arrival of the Canadian and American military forces.\textsuperscript{45}

As previously noted, Newfoundlanders were promised (albeit imprecisely) that elected government would return once the Colony was able to manage by itself. By mid-war, with government surpluses in the millions of dollars, cries for London to make good on its vow became more strident. In response, Deputy Prime Minister and Dominions’ Secretary Clement Attlee arrived at St. John’s in September 1942 on a fact-finding tour. He learned that while people wanted a return to self-government, they were not quite sure of what form it should take. A further parliamentary mission comprised of three British MPs followed in June 1943. This was not a formal Commission of Enquiry, billed more as an informal “goodwill” tour, but the delegation did submit its findings to the Dominions Office in November 1943 and issued a more formal report in December. The parliamentarians noted that while people did not want a return to the overtly partisan politics of 1932, Newfoundlanders were not keen on union with Canada, either.\textsuperscript{46}

With the end of the war, and a new Labour government under Clement Attlee in Whitehall, the question of Newfoundland’s political future became unavoidable. The answer was a National Convention of elected delegates to decide what form(s) of government was presented to the Colony in a national referendum. By this time, fearful of American entrenchment, Ottawa worried that if it did not entice Newfoundlanders to join Confederation, Canada could end up with an American protectorate at its doorstep - a bookend for Alaska. While the Canadian government could not blatantly interfere in the
process, that did not stop Ottawa from making resources available to pro-Confederate champion (former broadcaster and failed pig farmer) Joseph R Smallwood. The Attlee government also favoured Confederation and made sure that this option appeared on the final referendum ballot even though the National Convention rejected it, as most delegates favoured the return to responsible government before all else. Ultimately, the Confederate side won by a narrow margin after a very divisive campaign, and on 11 December 1948, the victorious Smallwood along with Canadian Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent signed the *Terms of Union of Newfoundland with Canada* in Ottawa. Newfoundland became the tenth province of Canada at 11:59 PM, 31 March 1949 (the timing was most important as Smallwood did not want this solemn event to occur on April Fools’ Day!).

Ultimately, Prime Minister Sir Robert Bond’s prediction came true, although it was sixty years after he made it and concerned war rather than commerce. But it nevertheless had the same impact on Newfoundland and its people. When the Second World War erupted in September 1939, Newfoundland was bankrupt and helpless. Five years later, it was prosperous and well defended. Further, Newfoundland was no longer the poor relative of the British Commonwealth but rather the object of a tug-of-war between Canada and the United States for ascendancy. Whereas pre-war, Canada considered the Colony nothing but a nuisance and liability, and Newfoundlanders looked at their western neighbour as the vociferous “Canadian Wolf,” ten years later both antagonists merged into an improbable union.

This would have been considered absolutely impossible in the 1930s. But the militarization of Newfoundland precipitated tremendous economic and social changes,
and transformed Newfoundland’s future. The military activity completely reversed the financial disasters that led to the loss of Responsible Government in 1934. Further, this and the infusion of thousands of young, healthy Canadian and American servicemen introduced a standard of living to the people of Newfoundland that had been heretofore only available to the merchant, government, and professional elite of the Colony. Having had a taste of “the good life,” so to speak, Newfoundlanders were not willing to return to the Dirty Thirties after the war with its poverty, class inequities, and barriers. When offered the chance to join the Canadian confederation - with its post-war social safety net - the majority of Newfoundlanders decided to take it (although St. John’s was decidedly anti-Confederate).

The campaign was heated, divisive, and religious, and pitted community against community, family against family, and might have erupted into sectarian violence at an earlier time. But Canada was no longer seen - at least by 52% of the population - as the land-grabbing, resource-stealing interloper of the past. Nevertheless, sixty-seven years later, many Newfoundlanders still feel antipathy towards the Country’s union with Canada, especially considering our newfound offshore oil wealth and habitually strained relationship with Ottawa. Proponents suggest that Canada, to the detriment of Newfoundland, has been the main beneficiary of what they argue was actually a shotgun wedding arranged between London and Ottawa.

Be that as it may, during the Second World War, Newfoundlanders lived (and died) alongside Canadians – in Europe and at home - and many married Newfoundland-based military personnel. The connections between the two neighbours during this period were as much shared experience as commercial or strategic, and this ultimately led to
Newfoundland’s seamless transition to Canada’s tenth province in 1949. This being the case, had Newfoundland not transformed into *The Gibraltar of America* during the Second World War, the erstwhile dominion’s fortunes (not to mention Canada’s) could have turned out quite differently. In October 2015, the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador officially designated the militarization of Newfoundland during the Second World War as *An Event of Provincial Historic Significance*.

1 Bond to the House of Assembly, 30 May 1890, as recorded in *Proceedings*, the St. John’s *Evening Telegram*, 13 June 1890. He is, of course, referring to the strategically important British outpost at the Western entrance to the Mediterranean Sea.

2 Newfoundland’s situation was somewhat ambiguous during the first half of the 20th Century. Along with most of the British Commonwealth, Newfoundland was granted Dominion status in 1907. However, it retained and continued to refer to itself both formally and informally as The Colony of Newfoundland. Furthermore, it did not send a delegation to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, despite its contribution towards the Great War, or ratify the Statutes of Westminster in 1932, granting legislative independence, as did the other dominions, and gave up responsible government altogether in 1934 in favour of a London-appointed Commission of Government. Consequently, Newfoundland was both a colony and a dominion in suspension, and entered the Second World War automatically with Britain’s declaration on 3 September 1939. William C. Gilmore, “Law, Constitutional Convention, and the Union of Newfoundland with Canada,” *Acadiensis*, Vol. XVIII, No. 2 (Spring 1989), 111-126. See also Greg Malone, *Don’t Tell the Newfoundlanders: The True Story of Newfoundland’s Confederation with Canada* (Toronto: Alfred A Knopf Canada, 2012), 1-32; JK Hiller (ed.), *Debates of the Newfoundland Legislature 1932 &1933* (2 vols. St. John’s: Queen’s Printer, 2010); Chris Brookes, *Not Fit For It: How Newfoundland Gave up Elective Democracy in 1934* (St. John’s: Battery Radio, 2004, 3-CD Audio Documentary); and John Edward Fitzgerald, (ed.), *Newfoundland at the Crossroads: Documents on Confederation with Canada*, (St. John’s: Terra Nova Publishing, 2002) 1-20.


5 John N Cardolis, *A Friendly Invasion: The American Military in Newfoundland, 1940 to 1990* (St. John’s: Breakwater Books, 1990). Cardolis speaks to the American military in Newfoundland (as does Steven High) but the phrase now commonly refers to the *overall* militarization of Newfoundland during the Second World War.

6 For an overall view of Newfoundland’s Second World War experience, visit *Heritage Newfoundland and Labrador* at http://www.heritage.nf.ca/browser/subject/Second%20World%20War. See also GWL

During a meeting with Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King at Hyde Park in April 1941, US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt suggested that Canada should take over Newfoundland. Mackenzie King replied that Newfoundland had not been included in Confederation because, to that point, it was just a liability but Canada would make it into an asset. Pickersgill, *The Mackenzie King Record*, 202. See also High Commissioner for Newfoundland to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 3 December 1941, in Bridle (ed.), *Documents*, I, 115; Minutes of a Meeting of War Cabinet Committee, 17 September 1940, in Bridle (ed.), *Documents*, I, 99; Minutes of a Meeting of War Cabinet Committee, 10 June 1941, in Bridle (ed.), *Documents*, 571; High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 3 December 1941, in Bridle (ed.), *Documents*, I, 115; and Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary, 2 March 1941, in Bridle (ed.), *Documents*, 103. See also David Mackenzie, *Inside the Atlantic Triangle: Canada and the Entrance of Newfoundland into Confederation, 1939-1949* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), 65. For a further examination of Newfoundland's strategic importance to the Allied cause, see ARM Lower, “Transition to Atlantic Bastion,” in RA MacKay (ed.), *Newfoundland: Economic, Diplomatic, Strategic Studies* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1946), 484-508.

The two facilities had been developed jointly by the British and Newfoundland governments during the mid-1930s in response to the tremendous strides being made in civil aviation. Military authorities feared that if the Germans captured either or both, the whole east coast of Canada and the United States could be threatened. Paul Collins, “Fortress Newfoundland: How the Fear of Nazi Attack Turned Newfoundland into an Armed Camp During the Second World War,” *Newfoundland and Labrador Studies*, XXVI, No. 2, (Fall 2011), 198-199. See also Peter A Henderson, *Guarding the Gates: A History of Canadian Forces Station St. John’s* (St. John’s: Canadian Armed Forces, 1992), 17-18.


16 This distinction had more to do with race than gestures of friendship. See High, Base Colonies, 25 & endnote 48, 213-214, and “Rethinking the Friendly Invasion,” Occupied St. John’s, endnote 2, 271.

The US seriously considered annexing some or all of its “destroyers for bases” facilities outright at war’s end but felt that doing so would seriously damage its relationship with Britain (not to mention Canada). One wonders what effect such a move would have had on the post-war Confederation debate in Newfoundland. Crane Brinton, The United States and Britain (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1945), 189-192.


It is very hard to nail down exactly how many armed forces personnel were stationed in Newfoundland and Labrador at any given time. Estimates change with the sources used. So, the best I can do is approximate that there were around 13,000 American and roughly 16,000 Canadian military personnel in Newfoundland and Labrador at their peak in 1943. See Christopher A Sharpe and AJ Shawyey, “Building a Wartime Landscape,” in High, (ed.) Occupied St. John’s, endnote 5, 275; Collins, The “Newfjohn” Solution, 81-82; John Edward Fitzgerald, “The Difficult Little Island that ‘Must Be Taken In:’ Canadian Interest in Newfoundland During World War Two,” Newfoundland Quarterly, XCIV, No. 2 (Spring 2001), 24; Parrott and Sharpe, “Swords Into Ploughshares,” 6; William Cole, “An Economic and Financial Review of Newfoundland during the Second World War,” David Mackenzie, (ed.) Newfoundland and Labrador Studies 8, 1 (1992), 76-78; Allan M Fraser, “History of the Participation of Newfoundland in World War II,” Peter Neary and Melvin Baker, (eds.) (St John’s: Centre for Newfoundland Studies, 2010), 105-120; Cardolis, A Friendly Invasion, 19; and A Friendly Invasion II: A Personal Touch (St. John’s: Creative Publishers, 1993), 66.

Frederick Alderdice was Newfoundland’s last Prime Minister and a member of the first Commission of Government. Doug Letto, Newfoundland’s Last Prime Minister: Frederick Alderdice and the Death of a Nation (St. John’s: Boulder Publications, 2014); Hiller, Debates of the Newfoundland Legislature 1933; Brookes, Not Fit For It; Parrott and Sharpe, “Swords Into Ploughshares,” 6; Cole, “An Economic and Financial Review of Newfoundland during the Second World War,”76-78; and Fraser, “History of the Participation of Newfoundland in World War II,” 105-120.

By way of example, in a letter dated 5 February 1946, A/ Lt-Cmdr WA Ramsay RCNVR, Maintenance Commanding Officer, Newfoundland Command, estimates that approximately 900 civilians were employed with his department during the Second World War (copy on file).

Wages at the various base sites were as much at five times those that could be made at the fishery pre-war. Melvin Baker, “Commission of Government, 1934-1949” (Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1994). Accessed 16 August 2015 at http://www.ufs.mun.ca/~melbaker/COMGOV.htm; Cole, “An
Economic and Financial Review of Newfoundland during the Second World War,” 74-79; and Fraser, “History of the Participation of Newfoundland in World War II,” 105-120. See also Peter Neary, “Clement Attlee’s Visit to Newfoundland, September 1942,” *Acadiensis*, XIII, No. 2 (Spring 1984), 105.


24 Fraser, “History of the Participation of Newfoundland in World War II,” 105-120. The Newfoundland Government also purchased the land for the RCN’s Bay Bulls overflow/repair facility at a cost of $300,000 as a contribution to the Allied war effort. Collins, *The ‘Newfyjohn’ Solution*, 125.


26 Bridle (ed.), *Documents*, 1418-1425; and St. John’s *International Airport Authority*, accessed 16 August 2015 at http://stjohnsairport.com/.


30 Steven High, “Rethinking the Friendly Invasion,” 151-190; and Jeff A Webb, “Gate Keeping and Newfoundland Popular Culture” in High, (ed.), *Occupied St. John’s*, 191-219.

31 “Criminal Cases Show Increase over 1940,” *The Evening Telegram* (St. John’s), 31 December 1941.

32 “Very Busy Year In Magistrate’s Court,” *The Evening Telegram* (St. John’s), 31 December 1943.

33 For a an official view of the behavior of Canadian personnel and the disparity between Canadian recreational facilities and those of the Americans in St. John’s, see “Memorandum from Director of External Operations, Wartime Information Board [GW McCracken] to General Executive Manager, Wartime Information Board [AD Dunton],” in Bridle, *Documents*, 1, 871.

34 The so-called “Welty Agreement” between the general in command of American forces in Newfoundland and Justice and Defense Commissioner LE Emerson provided that American servicemen would be transferred to American authorities for disciplinary action. Provincial Archives of Newfoundland and Labrador (PANL), GN 38, S4-2-4, file 3, Welty to LE Emerson, 4 October 1941; and GN 38, S4-2-7, file 16, Emerson to Welty, 7 October 1941.

35 Evidence suggests that it was this reliance on public facilities and the lack thereof that were the root causes of the VE Day riots at Halifax in 1945. See R H Caldwell, ‘The VE Day Riots in Halifax, 7-8 May 1945,’ *The Northern Mariner* 10, 1 (January 2000), 3-20. Indeed, some argue that it was the scarcity of established naval recreational facilities that was at the heart of the RCN’s morale problem, not outdated equipment. See Richard O Mayne, *Betrayed: Scandal, Politics, and Canadian Naval Leadership* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006), 82; and Marc Koechel, “‘Sailors Ashore’: A Comparative Analysis of Wartime Recreation and Leisure in Halifax and St. John’s” (Unpublished Masters Thesis, *St. Mary’s University*, 2003).

36 Unless otherwise noted, all information concerning facilities available to military personnel comes from Miller, *St. John’s Naval Guide Book*.
John's: Flanker Press, 2010).

especially at Gander) experienced after the Labrador immediately after the 9/11 attacks, and the profound shock and sorrow Newfoundlanders played a part in the extraordinary reception American airline passengers received in Newfoundland and


More commonly referred to as the “Amulree Report” as British peer Warrender Mackenzie, Lord Amulree, headed the Inquiry. Newfoundland Royal Commission Report 1933 (London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1933), 195; Malone, Don’t Tell the Newfoundlanders, 1-32; Hiller, Debates of the Newfoundland Legislature 1933; and Brookes, Not Fit For It. British Deputy Prime Minister Clement Attlee observed that politics in Newfoundland were seen “to some extent as a national sport.” Peter Neary, “Clement Attlee’s Visit to Newfoundland, September 1942,” Acadiensis, XIII, No. 2 (Spring 1984), 104.

Cadigan, Newfoundland and Labrador, 213.


The model community of Markland, between Whitbourne and Colinet, St. Mary’s Bay, is probably the best known of these failures. During the peak of base construction, the residents simply abandoned the community to partake of the better paid work with the American base contractors in Argentia, not returning until after the boom, if at all (although Markland still remains a community and home to the Rodríguez Markland Cottage Winery). Neary, Newfoundland in the North Atlantic World, 64-65; and Cadigan, Newfoundland and Labrador, 212-213.

Cadigan, Newfoundland and Labrador, 213-214; and Collins, “No Other Choice”, 5-7.

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In his report on his visit to Newfoundland in 1942, Clement Attlee noted that the lawyers and merchants of St. John’s controlled a disproportionate amount of the Colony’s wealth, and opposed “federation with Canada” as they feared competition from Canadian firms. Neary, “Clement Attlee’s Visit to Newfoundland,” 105-106. One could argue that it was the scale of the military spending in the St. John’s area that precipitated the anti-Confederate feeling. People had money in their pockets as never before and expected the prosperity to continue post-war.


During the Confederation campaign, a group of leading St. John’s businessmen proposed economic union with the United States, an idea that dates from, at least, the 1890 Bond-Blaine Convention. As previously mentioned, the Americans considered annexing some or all of their “destroyers for bases” facilities outright at war’s end. One wonders if this might have given the economic union campaign more traction had they done so. Cadigan, Newfoundland and Labrador, 155-158, 237-238; Webb, The Voice of Newfoundland, 165, and “Confederation, Conspiracy and Choice,” 175-176 & 180. See also Malone, Don’t Tell the Newfoundlanders, 163-167, 233-240; Peter Cashin, My Fight For Newfoundland, edited and annotated by Edward Roberts (St. John’s: Flanker Press Ltd., 2012), 178-203; Collins, No Other Choice, footnote 6, 5, and “Canada’s Plan to Torch St. John’s” during the Second World War: Upper Canadian Arrogance or Tabloid Journalism?” Newfoundland and Labrador Studies, XXIV, No. 2 (Fall 2009), 268; and Fitzgerald, Newfoundland at the Crossroads, and “The Difficult Little Island,” 21-28.

The Hon. JW Pickersgill represented the Bonavista-Twillingate District in the House of Commons from 1953-1967, but was serving as Special Assistant to Prime Minister Louis St Laurent when Newfoundland joined Canada in 1949. In his latter years, he intimated that Ottawa knew that Canada had...
gotten Newfoundland “cheap” at the time. See Malone, Don’t Tell the Newfoundlanders, 235; and Fitzgerald, “‘The Difficult Little Island,’” 29. Well-known Newfoundland businessman (and one-time Smallwood confidante) the late Geoff Sterling is reported to have concluded that all Newfoundland got out of Confederation were “the worst roads in Canada...[and] just handouts.” Bren Walsh, More Than A Poor Majority: The Story of Newfoundland’s Confederation With Canada (St. John’s: Breakwater Books, 1985), 316.